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Abstract
Over the years, Trust has been recognized in the Bled community as a key enabling factor to
stimulate Electronic Commerce. Authors have discussed formal aspects of trust, the role trust
plays in the adoption of both B2B and B2C Electronic Commerce, as well as mechanisms to
build trust and/or overcome the lack of it. This article first provides a brief overview of the
Trust-related articles in the Bled eConference. It then focuses on one specific aspect of the
facilitation of trade in absence of trust: the development of procedural controls that enable
Electronic Commerce at arms’ length, summarizing the contributions of the authors on this
theme at the Bled Conference since the early 1990s. The paper concludes with the authors’
current view on developing procedural controls, focusing on the design process itself, which
is often a rather lengthy process consisting of trial-and-error. Here a more analytical
approach is proposed to the identification of control requirements for inter-organizational
procedures. The approach involves abstracting the process to identify its basic deontic
elements. A model checking approach is then applied to identify needed controls.
Keywords: Trust, control, inter-organizational procedure, trade facilitation, deontic process,
electronic contracting
Dedication: In memory of our colleague, co-author, dear friend, and long time contributor to
the Bled Conferences, the late René W. Wagenaar.
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1

Introduction: Trust at the Bled Conference

The topic of “Trust” started to appear in 1994 in the Bled community, when Allan Gillman
discussed the “socio political dimensions of EDI trading relationships” (Gillman, 1994). He
draws (tentative) conclusions that a properly functioning EDI link will increase the level of
trust among trading-partners. However, while many articles until that time had discussed
factors of EDI adoption, the concept of “trust” had not really been addressed. In retrospect,
this might be due to the fact that EDI was (and is) seen as something between existing trading
partners who either have a pre-existing business partnership (valuable enough to bear the high
investments in the EDI link) or have an asymmetric power relationship where one can force
the other to comply.
This changed when, within and outside the Bled community, the topic of “EDI” was more and
more being encompassed by the wider definitions of electronic business, electronic
commerce, and e-marketplaces. From a strictly business-to-business setting, the consumer
came into the picture, leading to a whole new range of topics and researchers, including the
most recent inclusion of social media. The factor “trust” became increasingly more in the
focus of Bled researchers, be it as a variable in e-commerce adoption studies for SMEs and/or
consumers, but also more fundamentally looking at enabling factors, including legal
conditions, technological challenges, risk management approaches as well as socio-political
considerations.
Since 1994, about 60 papers have been published in Bled with “trust” as an important factor
in the research presented. Some have addressed the constructs that constitute trust, while
others have focused on the role trust plays in the adoption of e-Business / e-Commerce
solutions and e-Marketplaces in the consumer and SME world. Another group of authors has
focused on how to overcome a lack of trust and propose solutions in technical, legal,
organizational/institutional and/or procedural dimensions. Table 1 shows an overview of the
papers we identified, from the early 1990‟s until today, using three main categories: Trust
Fundamentals, Trust as a factor in Adoption of e-Business/e-Commerce/Social Media, and
Trust Enablers. We fully realize that this will not do full justice to the original work we have
thus categorized and we could not avoid making some somewhat arbitrary choices, but we do
hope that by showing the impressive body of work we can underpin the importance the Bled
conference has had on this important topic and each individual contribution in it.
In the “Trust Fundamentals” category, we have clustered those articles that investigate the
phenomenon “trust” itself, in terms of definitions and measurement. The definition of the
term depends on the view of the respective authors and the context in which it is placed.
When we view “trust” in the context of risk management, it can be seen as an estimated
(subjective) probability that the counterparty will act in a predictable and agreed-upon way, or
in other words, belief in the absence of opportunistic intentions from the counterparty. In the
context of e-Business, trust, or rather lack of trust, becomes an inhibitor for parties
(consumers, businesses and governments alike) to adopt new ways of doing business.
Following this reasoning, the confidence in a good turn of events can be achieved at the level
of the partnership itself (one trusts the good intentions of the other party).
Alternatively, the presence of opportunistic intentions can be addressed by controlling their
actual activities through the involvement of trusted third parties or institutions. Finally,
specifically in the context of e-business, the medium in which the activities takes place is
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based on technology. The additional risks associated with the use of this technology forms an
additional factor in the overall risk assessment of the actors in the e-Business theatre.
Trust Fundamentals
Partnership trust:
Gillmann, 1994
Riemer, 2004

Institutional trust:
Ratnasingam et al., 2003,
Hulstijn et al., 2005,
Verhagen et al., 2005
System trust:
Gogan et al., 2009

General theory and
measurement:
Tan et al., 1999,
Van Buuren et al., 2004,
Burgermeestre et al., 2010,
Schryen et al., 2010,
Soelnner et al., 2010

Trust as a factor for Adoption
B2B/B2G Context:
Tan et al., 1998a,
Castleman et al., 2001,
Tung et al., 2001,
Christensen et al., 2002,
Icasati-Johanson et al., 2003,
Koch et al., 2004,
Pucihar et al., 2005,
Lawson et al., 2005&2007,
Vatanasakdakul, 2008
B2C/G2C/C2C context:
Schubert, 1997,
Klein et al., 1998,
Sieber, 1999,
Schubert et al., 1999,
Farrell et al., 2000,
Loebbecke et al., 2001,
Ang et al., 2001,
Bouwman et al., 2003,
Jarvelainen, 2003,
Head et al., 2003,
Lui et al., 2003,
Hassanein et al., 2004,
Meents et al., 2004,
Verhagen et al., 2004

Trust Enablers
Institutional / Organizational:
Lee et al., 1995,
Bons et al., 1996&1997,
Ganzaroli et al., 1997&1999,
Lee, 2001a,
Gregor et al., 2000,
Rao et al., 2001,
Gordijn et al., 2003,
Kartseva et al., 2004

Social media context:
Ten Kate et al., 2010,
Mantymaki et al., 2010,
Riemer et al., 2010

Technology:
Clarke, 2002,
Ratnasingam et al., 2002

Legal / Privacy:
Gisler et al., 1997,
Hudoklin et al., 1997,
Smith, 1999,
Tan et al., 2002,
Di Biagi, 2003,
Jutla et al., 2003,
Dinev et al., 2005,
Polanski, 2005&2006,
Clarke, 2006,
Ong et al., 2009,

Table 1: Overview of Trust related articles in Bled 1994-2011.

Given these considerations, many authors have studied the impact of one or more of these
components of trust on the adoption of e-business and more recently social media. We have
classified the contributions into B2B/B2G versus B2C/G2B/C2C, which is a common way to
study the e-Business / e-Commerce /e-Government fields. At the end of the day, “trust”
always comes down to the estimation of one or more human beings and their resulting
intentions to engage (or not). However, there is a difference between the role that trust plays if
the individual acts in a role as “consumer” (or “patient” or “citizen”), representing him/herself
(and/or family) versus a role as an employee or representative of an organization. In recent
years, “social media” have been added to the equation, with their own set of dynamics due to
the critical role that user-generated content plays in these media and the often anonymous
nature of the individuals generating it.
The final category of papers deal with “trust” in a constructive manner, finding ways to
overcome a lack of trust by addressing institutional and/or organizational solutions, legal
solutions and technological solutions. The first two categories seek solutions that can improve
the institutional trust between parties, while the latter contributes to system trust. Institutional
and organizational solutions introduce ways for actors to secure their activities, typically via
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the intermediating role of trusted third parties. These parties may simply be agents that act on
behalf of one of the actors. However, they also include (governmental) institutions that
regulate interactions and whose only interest is the facilitation of the transaction itself, for
instance, through electronic marketplaces. In principle, these kind of solutions are
preventative from a risk management perspective: they try to avoid damage occurring in the
first place. Solutions in the legal field are usually more of a reactive nature. They will ensure
that parties have sufficient ways to repair any damages via the legal system. Removing
uncertainties about the position of parties after the fact is an important way to increase the
level of confidence that, even if something goes wrong, not everything is lost. It also provides
a negative incentive to those planning opportunistic behavior. In a social media context, but
also in other contexts involving private individuals, a separate concern is privacy, which we
have clustered in this domain as well. The identity of a person in combination with certain
attributes (i.e., knowledge about one‟s preferences, whereabouts, financial data etc.) is a
valuable asset in its own right that needs to be protected. Finally, studies in the technology
domain look at how technical solutions can help to contribute to trust as well. Often, they are
a consequence of solutions in the other two areas. For instance, legal solutions will typically
require that stated intentions must be documented in such a way that courts can rule on them.
In an electronic world, the concept of a signature was (and is) therefore an intensively
investigated research area. With credit card fraud and identity theft on the rise, lack of
technological solutions, their implementation and use is still a major threat to all e-Initiatives
in scope of the Bled Conference for years to come.
Figure 1 shows the number of articles on Trust over the years, divided into the three main
categories.

Figure 1: History of trust related articles in Bled 1994-2011

2 Inter-organizational procedures for trade
In the remainder of this paper, we will discuss how our work on procedural controls has
contributed to the Trust discussion, at Bled, and in other venues. This section positions our
work in the overall context of Trust and discusses the fundamental concepts we have based
our research on. The next section will discuss the focus of our current research and provides
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an outlook towards what we believe to be the next step in designing procedural controls for
trade, particularly international trade.
In 1994, we introduced the concept of “Open-edi” in Bled, looking at taking away the barriers
for establishing an EDI link by reducing the set-up costs (Bons et al., 1994). We were
convinced that the Internet would offer opportunities to engage in electronic business at a
much wider scale, and with new trading partners with whom no prior trading relationship
existed and trading would start at “arm‟s length”. The reduction of set-up costs was (and is)
an important factor in this, and understanding and agreeing about the context in which
messages are sent is a vital element therein. In fact, several international bodies such as the
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD), the World Customs Organization (WCO) and the International
Maritime Organization (IMO) have been working on the simplification, standardization, and
harmonization of trade rules, conventions, and procedures. Although few scientific articles
specifically addressed trade facilitation, the theme has been discussed frequently at the Bled
Conferences, where practitioners, scientists and regulators from the EU and the UN have met
over the years.
Our initial contribution to the simplification of trade procedures was to introduce a modeling
technique, “Documentary Petri Nets” (Lee & Bons, 1995), to model the inter-organizational
exchange of goods, funds and information. At the time, other researchers were looking into
the modeling of inter-organizational business processes, often adopting a “Business Process
Redesign” approach (Hammer, 1990). The research by Van Hee and Van der Aalst at the
Eindhoven University of Technology was also looking at the use of (colored) Petri nets to
model such processes, and was quantitative in nature (Van der Aalst & van Hee, 1996). Our
focus was less on the computational aspects of messaging or the operational efficiency of the
resulting processes, and more on the context in which the messages where exchanged.
When reasoning about these “messaging contexts” (a.k.a. “Open-edi scenarios”), we started to
realize that the function of many documents in international1 trade is not an operational one
but is related to controlling the execution of the underlying contract. The contract specifies an
exchange of actions, such as delivering certain goods or performing certain services (or
sometimes refraining from taking punitive action, such as licenses, or easements) against a
payment from the counterparty. In other words, each party does something to get something.
We refer to these actions done for others as 'doing' tasks.
When the principal parties do not have established trading relationships (i.e., insufficient trust
at the partnership level) and cannot directly observe the proper execution of these „doing‟
tasks by the other parties in the contract, they will want confirmation from an agent that they
do trust that the other parties have in fact acted according to their contractual obligations (i.e.,
sufficient trust at the institutional level). The activities relating to contract monitoring we call
'control' tasks. These control activities usually involve other parties such as banks, carriers
and inspection agencies and require documents as evidence of contractual relations (e.g. sales
contracts, credit contracts, insurance contracts, and transport contracts), regulatory relations
(e.g. import licenses, export licenses, and duty exemptions), and various kinds of performance
or operational evidence relating to these contractual and regulatory relations (e.g. shipment of
goods, payment of goods, and payment of tax). We use a similar distinction of the concepts
1 The theory developed can also be applied to trade within a single legal jurisdiction, but the amount of
uncertainty due to lack of common legal frameworks, cultural differences and physical distance make the
international domain more challenging.
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“trust” and “control” as defined by (Das & Teng, 1998). While they both contribute to the
same goal (“confidence in partner cooperation”), they have an “open-ended supplementary”
relationship. If it is possible to fully trust a partner (meaning: have full confidence that the
partner has only the best of intentions), controls are not necessary. Vice versa, if one can fully
control the other party‟s actions, the intentions of the party no longer play a role. While Das &
Teng focus on the long-term effects of trust and control and their interdependence, we focus
on the early stages of the relationship when there is (still) absence of trust and a single
transaction has to be completed in a safe and secure way.
The obligations of all these various parties could be incorporated into a single, complex multiparty contract. However, if things go wrong and one or more parties defaults, the question
arises as to the residual obligations among the remaining parties (imagine a contract between
A,B,C; A defaults; must B and C still fulfill their obligations?). For this reason, most multiparty contracts are divided into two party contracts. Thus, the full transaction may actually
involve a number of different sub-contracts. The trade procedure weaves all of these various
sub-contracts together. It consists of essential activities that realize the exchange of goods,
services, and funds between the parties, as well as other control activities that aim to limit the
risk of fraud. The trade procedure also contains any necessary control steps to ensure that the
contract is self-enforcing. Therefore, a large part of trade procedures involves creating and
transferring documents -- either in paper or in digital form.
With the Internet on the rise and Electronic Commerce becoming a reality, we asked
ourselves the question how “electronic documents” could make international trade more
efficient, eliminating the limitations of their paper-based equivalents. Furthermore, the
Internet made it possible to find new business partners in a globally connected world, and we
envisioned the need for safeguards in these starting relationships to increase. Finally, with the
digitization of certain industries and the introduction of “micro-payments”, we felt that there
would be the need for new control mechanisms, because the known and trusted methods may
be too expensive to operate in these settings.
As a consequence, our research evolved into the notion of “designing trustworthy trade
procedures”, where we added the concept of control and risk management in situations with
insufficient trust into the reasoning why EDI adoption was limited to “closed relationships” or
“electronic hierarchies” (Bons et al., 1997). We introduced the notion of a “trustworthy trade
procedure”, defined as “a trade procedure that governs a transaction in which the risk of
opportunistic behavior by one or more parties is present but which provides sufficient interorganizational controls to limit this risk.” (Bons et al., 1997). Based on a set of control
principles, derived from a combination of legal and accountancy literature, reasoning about
the “control quality” of the trade procedure and the principles were translated into control
patterns. Finally, we set out to automate this reasoning process. The aforementioned
“Documentary Petri Net” formalism was used to model the dynamic aspects of the trade
procedures. The obligations between parties were specified using a -predicate logic – at that
stage a basic one. A pattern-matching approach was used to identify potential control
weaknesses in a proposed procedure. A prototype implementation called “InterProcs”
translated these patterns into audit daemons (Lee, 1998), which, when applied to example
trade procedures, was able to show the control weaknesses and to support the design of
procedural controls for trade procedures.
Our research accordingly fits best into the institutional/organizational category discussed
earlier, although there is a strong legalistic component to it, because the starting point for our
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analysis was the obligations of parties and the contracts in which they are formalized. By the
late 1990s, the EURIDIS institute at the Erasmus University Rotterdam, where this research
was done, was intensively looking at the various aspects of trust and control under the
leadership of Ronald Lee. Its researchers have had a significant mark on the Bled community,
most notably Yao-Hua Tan, who co-authored over 12 publications in Bled involving trust
from 1998 onwards, and René W. Wagenaar.

3 Design stages for procedures driven by deontic structure
The research we described in the previous section provided a way to automatically analyze
the extent to which a given trade procedure had sufficient controls to remove the relevant
risks for the parties involved. However, the creativity to derive new or improved procedures
in changing circumstances was left up to the stakeholders or their representatives.
In the meantime, re-engineering of trade procedures has become in urgent need and has
attracted a great deal of interest from the international community. One key issue is the
increased concern for security since 9/11. Traders are now subject to many more government
controls, which increase administrative costs for trade. Studies show that trade procedures
cost from 2 to 10% of traded value. Meanwhile, globalization makes the world economy
depend on trade more than ever before. Since the year 2000, the world trade volume has
grown twice as fast as the world output and has grown consistently with the exception of
crisis year 2009. In 2011, world merchandise export exceeded $18 trillion (WTO, 2012). It is
estimated that reducing the administrative costs of trade procedures could save around €300
billion a year (Grainger, 2007). Thus, among governments and traders, there is a strong
interest in the redesign of controls in international trade, especially given the aforementioned
new possibilities offered by technologies such as (mobile) Internet, RFID tagging and so on.
In 2005, the European Union committed to spend €1 billion every year on “aid for trade”, of
which improving trade procedure is a major component. In the world, about $3 billion was
spent on trade facilitation in 2004 (Grainger, 2007).
A problem with technology motivated re-design is that there is a bias towards imitating the
procedures used with the previous technology, for instance by simply replacing paper
documents by their electronic equivalents. This may overlook the possibility that some
controls are no longer needed in an electronic scheme. For instance, at the time when
transferring funds between countries took several days, the seller often required a remittance
certificate issued by the remitting bank to verify payment before delivering goods. Now,
electronic fund transfers can be done within seconds. Instead of verifying payment from the
remitting bank, the seller can check his own account. Consequently, getting a remittance
certificate before delivery of goods is no longer required. Simultaneously, given the instant
execution of the payment, the buyer has less opportunity to stop a payment if he discovers
foul play along the way.
Another factor is that some control requirements can be satisfied in several ways. Each way of
enforcing controls may be appropriate to a specific situational context. If the designer only
examines control solutions without considering the underlying control requirements,
opportunities for improvement may be missed.
Finally, most of the controls involve the exchange of “documents” in one way or another. As
a consequence, the communication of those documents becomes a target in need of protection.
In (Bons et al., 1997), the link was made between the performative function of a document
and the technical requirement(s) of the communication, such as non-repudiation,
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confidentiality, integrity and in special cases, uniqueness (or impossibility to copy). These
requirements can be met using both procedural and technical measures, such as watermarks,
stamps and holograms in case of paper, or public key infrastructure based encryption in case
of electronic documents. Changing to e-business technologies, the issue is therefore not to
exactly duplicate behaviors of paper documents by electronic means, but rather to capture the
underlying functionality of the documents, which is about contracts, promises, licenses,
rights, duties, privileges, etc. These concepts, together with their properties (e.g. negotiability
and revocability), relations (e.g. conditional promises and mutual promises), and lifecycles
(e.g. creation, transfer and discharge), define what technical control requirements are needed.
We believe that the solution to this problem can be found by focusing at the underlying
control targets, regardless of the technology and mechanisms chosen to implement the
controls. Our focus is on the resulting procedural aspects and the role of information in the
execution of trade transactions. Other researchers, like Gordijn and Tan, while departing from
similar starting points, have a, in our view complementary, focus on the (quantitative) effects
of the value exchange itself and the impact on the underlying business models (see for
instance Gordijn & Tan, 2003).
The notions of permissions, rights, obligations, prohibitions, waivers, etc. are collectively
known as deontic concepts (Von Wright, 1951, 1968; Hilpinen 1971). These mark the
contractual interest of each party in the behaviors of the other contracting parties. An
obligation is what one party is expected to do, presumably for the benefit of another party. A
prohibition (for instance, a confidentiality agreement), indicates how one party constrains the
behavior of another. A waiver is a release from some obligation (for instance, diplomatic
immunity from parking tickets). A permission (such as a license) allows a party to do
something that would otherwise be prohibited.
The focus here is thus on the adequacy of deontic controls in contracting (trade) procedures.
These may involve the design of new procedures in some new problem domain, such as
government contracting, or it may involve the re-design of existing procedures, for instance to
incorporate electronic technologies. Our current challenge is to be able to generate new trade
procedures based on a set of conditions in which the procedure is to operate (i.e., technical
capabilities of parties involved, government regulations requiring or forbidding certain ways
of working, etc.). While a documentary procedure changes with implemented contexts, its
underlying “deontic” functionality – the way it changes the formal relationship among parties
– does not. Any new procedure, regardless of its form, needs to provide controls for the same
set of underlying deontic functions. In order to develop computational methods for this
purpose, a formal representation of the deontic functions in the procedure is needed, as well as
methods to systematically analyze the representation to identify control requirements.
There are two ways to approach the deontic analysis of inter-organizational procedures. One
way is to analyze the deontic effects at the level of an existing procedure, which already has
various documentary and other kinds of controls embedded in it. Using this approach, one
does a kind of reverse engineering, identifying the deontic relations, e.g. rights, duties,
privileges, prohibitions, liabilities, etc. of the involved parties that are implicit in the various
documentary exchanges and other actions (e.g. delivery of goods), for each of the steps in the
procedure under analysis. The dissertation of Dewitz (1992) follows this approach. An
alternative approach might be called 'start from basics'. In this approach, one designs the
procedure first in terms of the basic „doing‟ tasks that are to be accomplished, and adds the
„control tasks‟ later, based on the risks encountered.
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The former case is perhaps better for analyzing procedures that have evolved over a long
time. The latter is more useful in contexts where the situations are novel and/or urgent – such
as for military conflict situations and humanitarian disaster response. Furthermore, the
advantage of the „start from basics‟ approach is greater generality. The same deontic
procedure may have various documentary procedure implementations, depending on the
available technology. For instance, one version of the procedure may involve paper
documents. Another version of the documentary procedure may utilize digital documents sent
over a secure private network. Still another version of the procedure may utilize wireless
infrastructure and mobile phones.
The „start from basics‟ approach, as we envision it, consists of 5 distinct stages which we will
describe and illustrate with a simple example.

3.1 Stage 1: Specify basic terms and conditions of the contract
The first step is to compile a declarative specification of the basic terms and conditions of the
contract as formal logic specifications, independent of temporal ordering. The field of deontic
modeling offers several alternative formalisms that can be used to model this (for instance,
Tan & Thoen, 1998b, Tan et al. 2004). The purpose of this specification is to indicate the
basic operational tasks that each of the parties is to perform in the contract, as well as
constraints on the sequence in which they are to take place. These tasks may be physical, e.g.
manufacture or transport, or they may also be deontic, for instance a particular activity is
obligated, or an activity is specifically permitted, as with a license.
To illustrate this we use a simple contract involving two parties, Seller and Buyer, who make
two promises: one is the Buyer making a promise to the Seller to pay. The other is the Seller
promising to the Buyer to make delivery once the seller has paid. (This tiny example
obviously omits relevant details such as the price, the items to be delivered, and the deadlines
for the actions.)
[Buyer, Seller]: prepay_contract(Goods, Price) ==>
A::Buyer to Seller: promise(Buyer to Seller: pay(Price));
B::Seller to Buyer: promise(Seller: delivery(location(Buyer), Goods) / done(A)).
READING: a prepay_contract between Buyer and Seller is made when (A) Buyer
promises to Seller to pay a pre-agreed price and (B) when Seller promises to Buyer to
deliver Goods to location of Buyer, conditional on Buyer having done (A). Seller
commits to deliver the Goods to Buyer at his/her location.

3.2 Stage 2: Derive deontic process model
We introduced the “Documentary Petri Net formalism” in Lee & Bons (1995), to capture the
exchange of goods, funds and information. The more explicit emphasis on deontic aspects has
led us to adopt this formalism to facilitate these specifications, and to rename it “deontic petri
nets”. The contract process model for this example is quite simple, as indicated by Figure 2.
Essentially, there are two concurrent illocutionary actions in which each party makes its
respective promise. These are followed by the sequence of the contract performance, where
Buyer makes payment, followed by Seller doing delivery.

328

Roger W. H. Bons, Ronald M. Lee, Vu Hoang Nguyen

Figure 2: Process Model for Advance Payment Contract.

3.3 Stage 3: Deriving control requirements from deontic proc. model
Once the deontic process has been specified as a deontic petri net, the next stage of analysis is
to identify control requirements, which indicate control objectives to be achieved by the
documentary trade procedure. Deriving control requirements requires the examination of all
possible deontic changes in the process and the effects of such changes on the parties
involved. Besides information provided by the deontic process model, this task may need
additional information about the problem domain. Examples of such information are whether
a party trusts the other, or whether parties are able to directly observe task performance by the
other parties.
This framework focuses on two fundamental aspects of a deontic procedure: deontic relations
and deontic changes. In developing the rule base to identify control requirements, a taxonomy
was established of all categories of deontic change of an obligation. This taxonomy includes
the creation and termination of an obligation, as well as changes that take place in any
constituents of the obligation. Analogously, a taxonomy of deontic relations was also created.
This taxonomy includes unilateral obligations as well as the various contractual relationships
between two parties. For each deontic change, a catalogue was made of all possible fraud
potentials available to each party involved in the deontic relation, and the corresponding
control requirements to limit these fraud potentials was identified (Nguyen, 2008).
The various control requirements are classified into three categories: checking control,
evidentiary control, and deontic control. Checking controls are checking activities performed
by a party to make sure that a certain event has actually occurred. For example, in a
documentary credit transaction, the confirming bank only checks the shipping documents
against the specifications in the “Letter of Credit” to make sure that the goods were shipped
before making payment2. Evidentiary controls involve the creation, exchange or cancellation
of a document as evidence of an event. For example, when the seller delivers the goods to the
carrier, the carrier issues a bill of lading to the seller as evidence of the delivery. Finally, the
2 In this procedure, the bank does not physically verify the shipment of goods but relies on documentary
evidence only. For that reason, it is called a documentary credit; the credit part of the transaction being that the
confirming bank pays the seller prior to receiving the money from the buyer.

329

Generating Procedural Controls to Facilitate Trade: The Role of Control in the Absence of Trust

kind of deontic control considered in this research involves a secondary promise from a
trusted third party such as the promise from the issuing bank to the beneficiary of a
documentary credit.
Table 2 paraphrases the requirements generated from this analysis, paraphrased for
readability. Control requirements are indicated by the keyword 'should' in the paraphrase.
Note that, even for this simple contract, eleven control requirements were found! However,
when control solutions are selected, multiple control requirements can often be combined in a
single control solution, which will simplify the final trade procedure.

3.4 Stage 4: Select control solutions
A given control requirement may be satisfied by various control solutions. For instance,
verification of a person's identity might be accomplished by presentation of a photo ID, such
as a driver's license or passport, or it might be done by a more sophisticated biometric scan of
the person's fingerprint or iris. The choice of control solution is based on an analysis of the
risk of a control failure (either by willful deception or by accident) versus some estimate of
the potential damage due to the failure (e.g. unauthorized admission to a concert vs.
unauthorized admission to a nuclear reactor‟s control room). These aspects fall under the
category of security engineering, of which there is a large literature. See for instance
Anderson (2001), various works by Schneier (2003, 2008) and Lee et al. (2008) which
discusses control solutions for transferable rights.
Thus far, the focus has been on the generation of control requirements. We now briefly
consider how these control requirements become satisfied by application of selected control
solutions. In order to map from control requirements to control solutions, we utilize a rule
format common in logic programming:
P if Q1 and Q2 and ... Qn.
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List of control requirements resulting from the analysis
1&2

Verify that after buyer promises to seller that buyer will pay,
seller should check legal capacity of buyer and,
seller should check buyer’s compliance with applicable regulations re. payments

3&4

After seller promises to buyer that seller will make delivery contingent on buyer’s
payment,
buyer should check legal capacity of seller and,
buyer should check compliance with applicable regulations re. delivery, before buyer
pays

5

After seller promises to buyer that seller will deliver on condition that buyer has paid
buyer should receive evidence from seller stating this promise

6

After buyer has promised seller that buyer will pay
seller should receive evidence from buyer stating this promise

7

After buyer does pay
buyer should receive evidence from seller that buyer has paid

8

After seller does deliver
seller should receive evidence that seller has delivered

9

Before seller does deliver
seller should verify that buyer has paid

10

After seller has delivered
buyer should verify that seller has delivered

11

After buyer has paid
seller should verify that buyer has done payment

Table 2: Control Requirements for Advance Payment Contract.

For example, in the two instances of Control Rules 5 and 6 from Table 2, the control
requirement is that each party should receive evidence of the promise of the other. For many
routine transactions, this is done by means of a purchase order document followed by some
kind of order confirmation. In legal terms, the purchase order is a contractual offer, and the
confirmation is an acceptance. But note that even in this simple case, two documentary steps
are required for the creation of the promise. For instance, the control requirement for the seller
is the following
seller from buyer:
receive_evidence(done(buyer to seller: promise(buyer : pay))))
That is, the seller needs to receive evidence from the buyer about the buyer's promise to pay.
Rules used to derive a documentary control solution rule might look like the following:
has_evidence(X, PromisedAction) if
has_evidence(X, Contract) and
implies(Contract, PromisedAction).
has_evidence(Z, contract(X,Y, ContractTerms) if
has_evidence(Z, (X to Y: offer(ContractTerms)) and
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has_evidence(Z, (Y to X: accept(ContractTerms)) and
(X to Y: offer(ContractTerms)) < (Y to X: accept(ContractTerms)).
has_evidence(Z, (X to Y: offer(ContractTerms)) if
X to Y: purchase_order(ContractTerms).
has_evidence(Z, (Y to X: accept(ContractTerms)) if
Y to X: confirm_order(ContractTerms).
Thus, according to the first rule, one way to get evidence for a promised action is to get
evidence for a contract, which includes ('implies') the promised action. The second rule says
that a way to have evidence for a contract is to have evidence for an offer followed by an
acceptance. The final two rules say that a purchase order is evidence of an offer, and an order
confirmation is evidence for an acceptance. Note that there may be other ways to evidence a
promise or a contact, which would require additional rules. It should be emphasized that this
step, selection of control solutions, is the stage that is most dependent on the contracting
domain and is further most likely to change as new technologies become available. Thus, the
rules presented here are only illustrative.

3.5 Integrate control solutions to generate role procedures
Various control requirements involve the transfer of evidence that a certain action has been
done, e.g. signing a receipt for delivery. Such evidentiary control requirements can usually be
inserted as a single localized step in the procedure. More challenging are control requirements
that require a check or comparison to some state created earlier in the procedure. For instance,
a claim to refill one's prescription at the pharmacy requires a prior registration of a
prescription order from an authorized doctor. The various selected control solutions create a
set of additional (control) tasks that add to, or in some cases replace, the original set of
contractual (doing) tasks. The final step is to assemble this augmented set of tasks into an
integrated procedure.
The approach we take to analysis of procedures is an adaptation of model checking. Model
checking is used to determine if and how a program might arrive at a certain critical state that
can cause the system to crash. The system and the specified state are formulated using a form
of temporal logic. One popular representation is computational tree logic (CTL), which is the
representation used here. The essence of the problem is to determine if the specified condition
is satisfiable within the axioms that describe the system.
As with other kinds of modal logic theorem provers, a problem for model checkers is a
combinatorial explosion of the state space. However, recent developments in model checking
have made these techniques computationally more tractable (Clarke et al., 1999). In the
approach described in this paper, a logic programming based CTL model checker is used,
which is adapted from the version presented in Leuschel and Massart (2000). Essentially, the
technique involves converting the petri net form to a state-transition graph, and then matching
the control patterns to this transition graph. In our case, this involves an application of AI
planning techniques called procedure constraint grammar (Lee, 2001b), which essentially
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resolves the ordering constraints on the combined set of doing and control tasks. As explained
in (Lee, 1999), the procedures are divided by role, and all coordination is performed by
communication of documents. It is important to note that the architecture needs to permit the
downloading and autonomous execution of each role procedure by the respective parties.

4 Concluding remarks and future research directions
Trust has been recognized as a key factor in the adoption of e-Business solutions by the Bled
Conference over the years. Over 60 contributions have been published between 1994 and
2011, which we categorized into the fundamentals of trust, the role trust plays in the adoption
of business-to-business, business-to-consumer and currently Social Media applications and,
finally, ways to overcome a lack of trust by implementing controls. While the peak of
publications appears to have taken place in the beginning of the 2000s and attention seems to
have since shifted to other areas, “Trust” deserves a continuous point on the agenda,
especially at conferences such as Bled where the scientific community, the business
community and governmental agencies, especially the EU, meet to discuss new ways of
working in commerce, healthcare and government. With cybercrime at an all time high,
Social Media being increasingly confronted with serious incidents involving (anonymous)
participants and a general increase of fear, uncertainty and doubt in traditional (financial)
institutions, “trustworthiness” is a topic in need of continual re-evaluation.
Over the years we have been proud members of the Bled community and have contributed to
one specific area of “Trust”: enabling electronic commerce in situations where the level of
partner trust is (still) not high enough and alternative control procedures need to be
implemented. In the paper we discussed our key contributions to Bled in the 1990s, focusing
on the ability to automatically analyze whether or not a trade procedure provides sufficient
controls to the parties involved, based on a set of general design principles.
We have concluded this paper with the next step and focus on the design and generation
process of secure procedures and consequently the generation of control requirements.
Starting from the core of the trade procedure, the set of obligations that parties have towards
each other, a modeling perspective called deontic process modeling was introduced to
represent the entire life cycle of deontic relations. A formal representation, “deontic petri
nets”, has been developed to support the modeling and analysis of practical applications. This
formalism comprises two components: (1) a logic component, which combines aspects of
deontic logic, temporal logic, action logic, and institutionalized power logic for modeling
deontic states and deontic changes, and (2) a Petri net component for graphical representation,
analysis and simulation. These two components are integrated in a single semantic framework
based on state transition systems.
With this effort, we have hoped to show that the issue of trust and control is as vivid as it has
been and that with the help of AI based tools we can facilitate the continuous adoption of
business practices (“trade procedures”) to accommodate new circumstances, most particularly
the evolution of EDI into e- and now m-commerce and social media. We believe that two
topics are of specific interest for future research: responsive controls, and harmonizing
controls.
Responsive controls are control procedures that are able to actively respond to changes in
business and legal environment. Inter-organizational transactions typically span many
countries, and may involve different trade alliances. Countries and trade alliances impose
various regulatory control requirements on trade procedures. These requirements involve a
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wide range of issues, including tax collection, environmental protection, health protection,
human right protection, fair trade protection, and security protection. Regulatory control
requirements are frequently changed, since a country or a trade alliance may adjust its
regulations for political and economic purposes. Moreover, a country may enter or withdraw
from a trade alliance. Changes in regulatory controls could affect trading products, trading
countries, trading parties, etc. A challenge for future research is to design control procedures
that would enable straightforward and rapid adaptation to such changes.
Issues for harmonization of controls in trade procedures have been discussed by Lee and
Dominguez (2004). The harmonization problem arises due to differences in regulatory control
requirements among administrations governing a transaction. Different countries have
different requirements on particular kinds of transactions. Given that the countries are willing
to harmonize their differences in their respective trade procedures, how to should one go
about designing a system that could facilitate this process? Ideally, such a system would
provide features for detecting control weaknesses and possible conflicting requirements,
providing negotiation support to resolve control deficiencies and, if there are and conflicts,
providing decision support in identifying control solutions that provide inter-operability
among the parties, and helping to incorporate these control solutions into a the final
procedure. Given a transaction scenario, the process of harmonization could start with
gathering regulatory control requirements of all involved governmental administrations and
other parties. A system would need to be developed to detect conflicting requirements. These
conflicts could be resource conflicts (e.g. a party unable to comply with two different
requirements within a certain limitation of resource) or procedural conflicts (one
administration requires step A before step B, while another administration requires step B
before step A). All detected conflicting requirements would be identified as issues for
negotiation, for instance to be resolved by UN trade committees.
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